The truth is that the North Korean regime has been preparing for this event for couple of years, more intensively since August 2008 when Kim Jong Il suffered a stroke and failed to appear on the official celebration of the 60th anniversary of establishment of DPRK.  

The reports on the reactions from around the region are slowly appearing. The South Korean government has already convened a National Security Council meeting and has increased the Defcon (defense readiness condition) level from four to three and is expected to increase the Watchcon (anti-North Korean surveillance alert) level from three to two. This decision is based of few factors. First of all the two Korean states remain in state of war and the death of the commander in chief of Korean People’s Army is a reason to be prepared for any consequence. Moreover as latest development shows, when there is a sign of internal instability, North Korea tends to avert the attention and starts with external provocations. Furthermore when taking last year’s military clashes into account the reaction of South Korean government is quite rational.  

The most intriguing question, however remains what comes next? There is no clear answer to this, but several possible scenarios can be put on the table. The line of the division of scenarios can be the result of development – the securing of the existence of DPRK is one and the possibility of cessation of the regime is the second.  

When we are talking within the possibility of first line, the regime can secure its existence through different paths. Since the last September (2010) North Korea has a heir designate, Kim Jong Eun, the youngest son of Kim Jong Il. Jong Eun is in his late 20s and he was elected as a vice-chairman of Military Committee of the Korean Workers Party (KWP) and was promoted to the position of four-star general, however he has no military experiences. As for the development within last year he has accompanied his father on several of his in spot guidance inspections around the country (reportedly Kim Jong Il has died in the train heading to one of his inspections) however is impossible to evaluate the real position he has within the power structure of North Korean regime.  The first possibility is that he will manage to secure his position and will launch his own rule based on his father and grand father legacy and will build upon the military first policy and juche idea. He has at the end a group of advisors and tutors to his hand to help him, what is important to add however is that the other figures within the leadership will only assist him if their interest and positions will be guaranteed. His closest tutor, Jang Song Taek (Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law) was named to the position of vice-chairman of National Defense Commission (NDC – Kim Jong Il has ruled as a chairman of this Commission for last 17 years) and was made responsible for the smooth power transition. Nevertheless according to several expectations, he can be one of the figures that will at the end challenge Kim Jong Eun and his rise to power. Mr. Jang has a long time experiences serving as a party cadre in the highest position of the KWP. Moreover his wife was promoted to the position of four-star general together with Kim Jong Eun. Probably the worst-case scenario will be the civil war among different groups within the military, one supporting the designate heir Kim Jong Eun, and the other backing Jang Song Taek lead by his wife.  

As no one is familiar with the situation in the North Korean army is possible to expect more interest groups within its structure. Moreover the Party and its structure have to be taken into consideration as well. During his rule, Kim Jong Il suppress the position of the Party as he ruled as chairman of National Defense Commission and based his rule on the military policy. Nevertheless the last year’s development when Kim Jong Eun was elected within the Party hierarchy was explained as an attempt to restore and equalize the position the Party has within the system. The question remains whether this process has been successful.

The family of Kim Jong Il’s brother who is the longest serving ambassador (in Poland) can also play a role in the internal power struggle. As a possible competitor to Kim Jong Il, Kim Pyong Il was appointed ambassador already at the beginning of 90s and may still have supporters within the regime structure. Moreover Kim Jong Eun has two brothers who have been omitted from the transformation process last year. Specially the oldest son Kim Jong Nam, who is currently living in China, may return and attempt to gain support from the Party or military officials.  

It is hard to predict which of these scenarios is most probable to materialize, it is likely that the ruling elite in North Korea will try to secure its position in any way and support will be given to a person who can guarantee its privileges.  

As for the second line of possible development, the North Korea may ceased to exist in the case the civil war will break out and none of the groups will be able to secure enough power to preserve the stability. The civil war that would have had a negative impact not only on Korean peninsula but also for whole region, it is likely that all the regional players would intervene in the case of internal military conflict in DPRK. As it appears for last several years, all the great powers are interested in stabilizing the situation and securing the status quo in the region.