Resolution 1973 was adopted in response to the Qaddafi regimes’ use of excessive force to suppress the popular uprising in Libya, which had started more than a month earlier. Towards the end of August the uprising reached the Libyan capital, Tripoli. The death of Col. Qaddafi followed two months later and at the time of writing the North Atlantic Council had taken a preliminary decision to end Operation Unified Protector on 31 October.

            From the outset, NATO’s role in Libya has generated much debate. Most of the discussion has centred on the future of the alliance after Libya. Some assessments have been positive while others have argued that Libya should not be viewed as a success, but rather as a “wake-up call” for NATO.[1] For many, however, Libya effectively heralds the end of the alliance. Indeed, one colourful commentary published in May concluded that NATO is headed for a “sandy grave in the Sahara desert of Libya”.[2]

Let’s not get carried away.

The truth is the impact of Libya on the future of NATO should not be overly exaggerated. Indeed, Unified Protector is merely a sideshow to NATO’s main effort in Afghanistan, which will have a far greater bearing on the future of the Alliance. In addition, Libya has in fact taught us little new about NATO. The much maligned political impasse that preceded NATO’s role was not a new phenomenon. Political discord was a feature of NATO during the Cold War and has surrounded each and every one of the alliance’s major “out-of-area” undertakings since then. Much has been made of the “participation problem” as well, namely the fact that only 15 out of 28 member states made a military contribution and only five participated throughout the campaign in actions to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under the threat of attack.[3] The lack of participation in relation to “out-of-area” operations is not a new development, either. Greece sat out Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, for example. Neither are national caveats, which is a problem that has beset the alliance’s operations in Afghanistan. It should also be added that the “participation problem” is not as dramatic as it first appears since only three of the non-participants reportedly possessed the necessary capabilities to contribute to either one or all three elements of Unified Protector.[4]

Reasons to be positive.

While the influence of Libya on the future of NATO should not be overly exaggerated, Unified Protector has shown enough to suggest that the alliance will prove the critics wrong, and survive. First, Libya has demonstrated the utility of NATO. When the U.S. administration wished to cede command of the initial military action, NATO, with its integrated command structure as well as its experience and expertise in coordinating complex multinational military operations was the only viable instrument available. The EU not only lacked the political consensus to act, despite having many of the same member states, but also lacked the capacity to act autonomously. Further, it is unlikely the EU will become a viable tool for undertaking similar operations in the future. Of course, deep political divisions were present within the alliance. Nonetheless, NATO was still able to act and do so promptly while integrating non-member states into command-and-control structures at the same time.

            Libya has also shown that Europe is willing to step up and shoulder the lion’s share of responsibility for the security of the continent. For the first time, European member states led the political and military response to a crisis or conflict within or around their own continent, while the U.S. assumed a “supporting”, albeit, decisive role. This role reversal is promising for the future of NATO, but only if this new division of labour is sustainable. On the strength of Libya, one could be forgiven for thinking otherwise. Europe noticeably struggled to raise the necessary military capabilities as well as sustain them. Nine member states could not participate in Unified Protector because they lacked the appropriate capabilities.[5] Norway and Italy had difficulties in sustaining their commitment.[6] Question marks were even raised with regards to the sustainability of the British contribution.[7] Looking ahead, European member states face further challenges in this regard, bearing in mind the current financial hardship on the continent and the subsequent decline in national defence spending among European member states, which has fallen by 10.1% or $33.714 billion from 2008 to 2010.[8] Still, ways exist to address the shortfall (see below).

            Member state contributions to Unified Protector (or the lack thereof in some cases) was not only a problem but, in some instances, a positive. For one, France essentially led the political as well as military efforts within the alliance for the first time, having spent many years on the fringes. The fact that Paris shared the lead with London is equally noteworthy. There have, of course, been some discrepancies in national policy along the way. But on the whole, there has been little daylight between the two and Libya appears not only to have vindicated closer Franco-British defence collaboration agreed last November but also surely reinforced it.[9] Remarkably, there is even reason to believe that Germany’s abstention may turn out to be a blessing in disguise. The political fallout over Libya appears to have driven a new seriousness as well as level of ambition in Berlin regarding the nations’ security-and-defence policy, which is reflected in the new Defence Policy Guidelines published in May 2011.[10] Significantly, the Guidelines record the political elites’ willingness to use the Bundeswehr not only to serve national interests but also for alliance solidarity. A greater role for Germany in European security is important since Unified Protector pushed the Franco–British tandem to its political and operational limits.[11]

            Ultimately, it is hard, if not impossible to deny that Unified Protector has been a success despite the ambiguous and incoherent strategy as well as the early operational setbacks. There should be no doubt that NATO action helped protect civilians and civilian populated areas. In addition, the National Transitional Council would not have been able to reach Tripoli, thus effectively remove the Qaddafi regime from power, without NATO air support. At the same time, civilian casualties were kept to a minimum and NATO lost no personnel.

Much work still to be done.

While Libya has shown enough to suggest that NATO will survive, its mere survival is, of course, not the aim. Rather, the objective is to remain relevant. Unified Protector has exposed two potential spoilers in this regard, which member states must therefore address. The first relates to the growing lack of political cohesion among member states. While not necessarily new developments, the deep political divisions over the operation in Libya as well as the subsequent “participation problem” are nonetheless worrying. In the case of the latter, non-participation admittedly reached new levels in Libya and national caveats became more widely accepted.[12] Financial austerity and “Afghanistan fatigue” will only serve to exacerbate the political divide in the future. Member states should be careful not to let this issue become a “Trojan horse” that destroys the alliance from within. Thus, it is crucial that they remain politically united as regards the alliance’s main effort in Afghanistan, which ultimately means withdrawing national forces in unison. 

            The second and by far the most pressing problem relates to military capabilities. The decline in national defence spending among European member states in recent years and subsequent cuts in military capabilities have serious implications for the Alliance. They have the potential to widen the capabilities gap within Europe as well as between the U.S. and the rest of NATO. This could undermine the alliance’s ability to act in concert and in turn the very principles on which NATO was founded, namely collective defence and alliance solidarity. Spending reductions and capability cuts could also weaken political cohesion, specifically by fuelling the burden-sharing debate across the North Atlantic. Indeed, former U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates has recently warned that NATO faces the real possibility of “a dim, if not dismal” future if current trends in Europe are not halted or reversed.[13] Further, his successor, Leon Panetta, has spoke of the transatlantic partnership having arrived at a “critical” juncture.[14] While European member states are generally unable to address the capabilities issue by spending more on defence, they can “spend smarter”. The most oft-cited example is multinational collaboration, which takes many forms such as pooling and sharing as well as joint acquisition and the co-development of capabilities.[15] Such an approach is not without its potential drawbacks.[16] Thus, some tough choices lie ahead. A strong signal of intent, however, would be sent if NATO heads of states and governments endorse the Secretary General’s “smart defence” initiative at the Chicago Summit in May 2012.

Gareth Chappell is an analyst in the Security Programme at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw. His current research focuses on European security.