Egypt’s revolution ... and the challenges to democratisation

Mass protests erupted in Egypt, the most populous country in the Arab world, in January 2011, as the revolution in Tunisia brought to a boil an accumulation of grievances against the rule of President Hosni Mubarak. After 18 days of sustained protests, Mubarak resigned and turned over power to the military thereby ending 30 years of autocratic rule.

 The revolution in Egypt was the first revolution of the internet age.  Web-based communities and free access to first hand evidence of the situation in Tahrir Square brought together people inside and outside Egypt and created the space for an unprecedented upheaval unimaginable even in the weeks and months before: the peaceful ouster by a broad, popular uprising of an authoritarian government whose repression and corruption had been tolerated by the international community because of its role at the centre of long held security interests in the region.

Yet, the ousting of Mubarak was only the beginning of what is likely to prove a rocky road towards democratisation (Rocha Menocal 2011). As Egypt engages in the messy process of building a democratic society, some of the limitations of the social movement that was so effective in ousting Mubarak have begun to show. Its spontaneous, un-organised, and virtual character has also made it more difficult to keep up the pressures to fulfil the promises of the revolution. Outside audiences, who were instrumental in strengthening the cause of the protestors at the international level, have also become distracted and moved on to other causes. As the novelty of the internet as an agent of social change begins to settle, it has become clear ten months on that the struggle for democracy in Egypt may remain as traditional as ever, confronting entrenched powers and conflicting sectarian interests that remain very much in force.

Some progress has been made. Under the command of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which has stated repeatedly that it intends to hand over power to an elected civilian government as soon as it seems sensibly possible, there have been moves towards greater openness, fairer rules, and more accountable institutions. Some corrupt officials have been purged and tried; the state security agency associated with abuses under the previous regime has been dissolved; a national referendum on amendments to the Constitution was approved by a substantial majority in March 2011; and restrictions on the formation of political parties have been lifted (The Economist 2011).

Yet the military has moved reluctantly, and often only in response to continuing street protests. Disregarding many of the basic aims that inspired the revolution in the first place, the SCAF has continued to rely on emergency laws and summary justice dispensed by military courts. It has targeted media and opposition figures perceived to be critical of its authority; and it has continued to display a tendency towards decision-making by committee. Generals within the SCAF have also suggested that the military should be granted "some kind of insurance" under a new constitution "so that it is not under the whim of a president" – effectively protecting itself from any civilian oversight (Martini and Taylor 2011). Overall, the SCAF appears to have carefully managed the course of the country’s transition to ensure that its institutional and corporate interests are protected and that much of the socio-political elite remains intact. (Brumberg 2011; Martini and Taylor 2011)

The key challenge for the new emerging Egypt is thus establishing a regime that is democratic not only in name but also in practice. At stake is nothing short of building a legitimate and representative political system that can break with the country’s authoritarian past, lay the foundations for a more inclusive political settlement, and re-articulate the nature of state-society relations along more equitable lines.

Elections and a new constitution

Elections and a new constitution are both crucial elements in this endeavour.  But as the ongoing public debate over whether elections or the process of writing a new constitution should come first, the sequencing between these two fundamental priorities is not free of tensions. Proponents of the “Elections First” camp have emphasised that elections need to be held first in order to end the post-revolutionary rule of the military as quickly as possible and provide a basis of popular legitimacy to the emerging political system. Those advocating a “Constitution First” approach have argued that the legitimisation of a new political order is in fact premised on the writing of a constitution that can establish the new rules of the game before elections are held, even if this may slow down the electoral timetable.

 As experiences of transitions and reform elsewhere in the developing world show, there are no easy or straightforward answers to this sequencing dilemma. In Liberia in 2003, for example, there was a decisive choice in favour of holding elections to transfer power as quickly as possible from a National Transitional Government that was widely perceived as corrupt and self-serving – but to this day Liberia has not drafted a new Constitutions, and the process of national reconciliation remains unfinished (OECD 2011). In Nepal, on the other hand, disagreement between the various actors on federalism, ethnic proportional representation and religious diversity in the constitution has led to a stalemate in the political reform process (Kausch 2011).

In Egypt, the SCAF has outlined a course for the transition period based on holding elections first, and drawing up a Constitution later. Under the current plan, elections to the lower and upper house of parliament will be held in a staggered process due to start at the end of  November 2011 and continue until March 2012. The two houses will then choose a smaller body to write a new constitution, which will be submitted to a referendum. Presidential elections will take place once this process is completed, and probably not before late 2012 or 2013. But there are signs of growing impatience with the SCAF’s timetable and the peculiarly complex technicalities of the voting system it has instituted – especially as compared with the experience in Tunisia, where military leaders have charted a faster and apparently simpler route to democracy (based coincidentally on a “Constitution First” approach). Egypt’s seven leading presidential hopefuls, who cross a spectrum from hard line Islamist to secular and liberal and have found little to agree on other issues, have joined forces to demand that the timeline be drastically shortened (The Economist 2011b).

 How inclusive and representative the emerging political order?

A greater concern is that that this process may not deliver a more inclusive and representative political system in Egypt. A crucial challenge is that, after 30 years of authoritarian rule, political organisation, especially in terms of credible (opposition) parties, remains extremely weak and fragmented. As noted above, what made the social movement that ousted Mubarak strong in the first place may also be one of its greatest weaknesses. The movement remains diffuse and the ties that bind its different elements together are weak and transient. Social activism, transformational as it may be, cannot in itself substitute for adequate and coherent organisation (Gladwell 2010). So far protestors have lacked clear leadership and representation, which has made meaningful negotiation with the military government in charge difficult.

Of course, there are a few well organised groups that are also deeply rooted within certain sectors of Egyptian society. These include perhaps most notably the Muslim Brotherhood and remnant elements of the National Democratic Party, both of which have dominated the Egyptian political landscape for decades. However, the holding of parliamentary elections as has been envisaged is likely to favour these forces and give them disproportionate voice in determining the constitutional future of the country, given that the new parliament will itself be responsible for drawing up the constitution (Kausch 2011, Martini and Taylor 2011).

This points to another fundamental challenge of the transition in Egypt: the process to establish a new constitutional order has been remarkably non-participatory. For example, the constitutional amendments that were submitted to a national referendum in March 2011 were drafted committee by a of legal experts and constitutional scholars appointed by the military, with minimal feedback from other relevant stakeholders and social groups. The same is likely to happen with the process of writing the constitution itself. So far, no provisions have been made to involve citizens more broadly in this process, putting it in the hands of the 100-member constituent assembly to be elected by parliament. But if the process remains non-participatory, it will constitute a major wasted opportunity to generate the kinds of shared consensus and agreements on the fundamental rules of the game and the social cohesion that are essential to sustain a viable and resilient state, especially one intended to have a democratic basis.

How can the process of democratisation in Egypt be supported?

As Egypt prepares to hold elections and to draft a new constitution, the next several months and years will be critical in shaping the course and nature of the country’s transition. What can domestic and international actors do to address the challenges that have been outlined and to support the process of democratisation more effectively so that it does not get stalled or even derailed? Two tasks in particular are essential:

- promoting a nationwide dialogue to draft the constitution; and

- working to make that process as widely participatory and as inclusive as possible of all political forces in Egypt

Fostering the development of political parties will be an essential component to this. There needs to be an aggressive, strategic, and long-term outreach into political party building. Such efforts should seek not only to identify and support democratic, secular interest-based parties but also to engage with and incorporate religious-based parties (e.g. the Muslim Brotherhood) and other entrenched interests, including the military and the disbanded NDP. Crucial issues like what kind of role religion should play in the state, how minorities should be incorporated into the political system and their rights protected, how power should be de-concentrated and checks and balances established, etc., are all at stake. They need to be addressed through an ongoing process of national dialogue that is as participatory and inclusive as possible of the many forces that comprise the Egyptian political landscape. Otherwise, there is a danger that the transition in Egypt may well bring a change in leadership, but not the kind of substantive transformation in the political system that the Egyptian people have been fighting for. For  these efforts to be successful, it will also be essential (in part through social media and news web-based communities and also more traditional media) to keep up the pressure on Western governments to support ongoing reform processes, hold the military to account, and resist the temptation to allow (regional) security interests to lead to a return of “business as usual” because it seems more expedient.

Alina Rocha Menocal is a Research Fellow in the Politics and Governance Programme at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), with particular expertise on the challenges of democratisation and governance.

 References

Brumberg, D. (2011) “The Path to Democracy in Egypt”, The Atlantic, 13 July.

Gladwell, M. (2010) “Small change: why the revolution will not be tweeted” The New Yorker, 4 October.

Kausch, K. (2011) “Constitutional Reform in Young Arab Democracies”, Policy Brief. Madrid: FRIDE.

Martini, J. and J. Taylor (2011) “Commanding Democracy in Egypt: The Military’s Attempt to Manage the Future”, Foreign Affairs, September/October.

OECD (2011)  “Capacity Gaps at Centres of Government – Coordination, Implementation Monitoring, Communications and Strategic Planning in Post-Conflict and Fragile Situations. Country Case Study: Liberia”, unpublished report. Paris: OECD / Partnership for Democratic Governance.

Rocha Menocal, A. (2011) “Transition in Egypt: the challenges of going beyond a democratic facade”, ODI Blog, 17 March.

The Economist (2011) “Egypt and democracy: Get a grip, then go”, The Economist, 8 October.

The Economist (2011) “Egypt’s future: The generals’ slow and unsteady march to democracy”, The Economist, 8 October.