In few days only, both the US and Russian government made considerable steps back by announcing the practical US withdrawal from the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and by Kremlin’s threats of scraping, the paramount of recent bilateral achievements, the New START nuclear reductions treaty. The course of these consecutive events poses renewed doubts about the viability of apermanent spring in US-Russian post-cold war relations, as well as it indicates presence of the potential for further stalemate and an eventual complex breakdown of the “Restart” spirit.

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The “black week” in US-Russian relations started on Tuesday (November 22^nd) when the US State Department announced that it is withdrawing from its reporting obligations enshrined in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, as a retaliatory act against Russia – which itself made its decision to stop honoring that treaty already in 2007. The CFE Treaty was signed in 1990 in order to impose numeric ceilings on key categories of conventional weaponry located on “both sides” of Europe.

Since then, the Russian Federation has refused to accept any inspections and also ceased to provide technical information to other CFE Treaty signatory parties – regarding the state of its military forces, as it is required by the literature of the Treaty.

This decision is probably an unsuccessful end-product of years-long endeavor of NATO members aimed to construct a diplomatic solution addressing this issue. In May this year, the US State Department still seemed committed to maintain the diplomatic trajectory – claiming that "the United States remains firmly committed to revitalizing conventional arms control in Europe."

However, the critics of rapprochement efforts remained highly cautious vis-à-vis the idea of bringing Russia back to the negotiating table and eventually readopting its treaty obligations, given the fact Kremlin lacks concessions and good-will gestures in current trend of arms controls on the “old continent”.

If this was not enough, Russian President Medvedev made an announcement regarding another staled project addressing the challenges of the Euro-Atlantic security. The, still technically, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev issued a some kind of “last warning” before Russia starts to target the components of US missile defense system in Europe with its missiles in case that no agreement (regarding the modus operandi of the Missile Defense) is reached.

The U.S. missile defense plan, a system of land and at sea based missile interceptors around the continent, gained its current shape two years ago. Since then, the Obama administration maintains its claim that the system is designed to counter threats posed by Iranian ballistic missiles and by its presumptive nuclear program. Despite the fact that both parties agreed on cooperative approach at the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, Kremlin still failed to overcome its fears that the system is secretly aimed to produce strategic advantage against Russian nuclear forces.

What is even more disturbing is that Medvedev has indicated that if no legal assurances (stipulating that system would and could not be used against Russia) are made, Russia might seriously consider moving towards the withdrawal from the New START nuclear reductions treaty – as this option is actually enshrined in the preamble of the Treaty."

Not so much coincidentally that announcement fills into the electoral campaign - due to the December 4^thparliamentary elections. Moreover, this announcement is only a follow-up to several analogical ones made by Russian officials about NATO during the course of previous weeks. As traditionally in US-Russian relations, elections tend to produce considerable amount of populist saber-rattling of politicians on both sides.

The ruling United Russia’s popularity has been newly facing unusually noticeable challenges and Medvedev’s shift toward tough talk might be primarily “only” an effort to shore up support as voters enter the last week before the polls.

Nevertheless, this has been the second backwards step in the U.S.-Russia reset in the timeframe of only two or three days. One already starts to wonder whether the project of the U.S.-Russian resetmay actually have sufficient potential to survive the lifetime of at least the current U.S. and Russian administration.

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Whether it is only cheap rhetorical exercise aimed at swift electoral build-up or well thought-out and nuanced tactical assertion, the stakes are too high to be objected to unnecessary hazard with strategic stability – especially in such a volatile period as much for the US as for Russia and Europe, as well.  

One can vividly recall the celebratory scenes from the Prague Castle where both chief-executives signed the most complex arms control document in nearly two decades. It is even more shocking to realize how great effort might be lost in case the whole Restart breaks down. Two year of pro-active diplomacy consisting of (both technical and political) thrust building measures might disappear and do not return for a considerably longer time to come. Both of the administrations deserve substantive credit for committing themselves to political cooperation, agreement in civilian nuclear cooperation, nuclear arms-reduction and for the (upcoming) institutional integration of Russia into the global trade system. 

Russia have been, up to this moment, showing that it can (at least to some extent) sacrifice its imperial way of managing relations among world powers for the sake of greater progress in becoming an integral part Euro-Atlantic sphere. Paradoxically, the Kremlin seems to quite ignore the fact that all their appeal for more seriousness and respect in the way Russia is handled can only be achieved by the existence of a sound and enduring platform of cooperation. The last almost three years proved that such an informal platform can exist providing that there is sufficient will to nurture it by both of the parties involved. With all its inefficiencies (including the perceived US negligence of its relations with Central European allies), the so-called “Restart spirit” has been the best thing that happened to US-Russian political relations for more than a decade.

While the notion that foreign policy is always only an extension of domestic politics certainly holds some water, it is though noteworthy that in this case it is rather probable that populism will counterproductively backfire on Kremlin. The current displeasure of the Russian electorate is in all likelihood originating in socio-economic challenges within the Russian society, rather than in the perception of lack of recognition of Russia’s global power status. Thus, playing the hard card might, on one side, not resonate efficiently while, on the other side, still causing substantial harm to Russia’s standing vis-à-vis the US and NATO – as it actually will do in case that the Kremlin does not adopt a more pragmatic approach towards what it has already achieved during the “Restart” and what it still might achieve by maintaining the spirit of it instead of objecting to cheap gambling.